Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 02221 142001Z

61
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 SAM-01 EA-11 NIC-01 DRC-01 /131 W
---------- 028908
P R 141712Z FEB 74
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6174
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
USMISSION BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMCONSUL MUNICH
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 2221

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PINT UR
SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF SOLZHENITSYN EXPULSION

1. SUMMARY: ONCE THE REGIME DECIDED TO MOVE AGAINST SOLZHENITSYN, HE WAS WHISKED TO GERMANY WITH RAPIDITY AND FINESSE. THE LEADERSHIP PRESUMABLY WEIGHED CAREFULLY THE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS OF ITS DILEMMA AND, AS EXPECTED, OPTED FOR DEPORTATION AS THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND LEAST COSTLY OVER THE LONG RUN. SOLZHENITSYN WAS SEEN AS BENT ON MARTYRDOM, WHICH MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FROM THE REGIME'S POINT OF VIEW TO IGNORE HIM. AND FROM THAT POINT OF VIEW, DEPORTATION WAS SEEN BOTH AS A SERIOUS PUNISH-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 02221 142001Z

MENT YET ONE WHICH--NOT BEING PHYSICAL--WAS MORE HUMANE,

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

AND THUS LIKELY TO CAUSE LESS TROUBLE FOR THE REGIME'S DETENTE POLICY THAN WOULD JAIL OR INTERNAL EXILE. THE CONCLUSIONS WHICH CAN BE DRAWN ARE NOT NEW: THE REGIME STILL ATTACHES HIGH PRIORITY TO BOTH INTERNAL SECURITY AND DETENTE, AND IS WILLING TO SHAPE ITS TACTICS IN PURSUING THE FORMER FOR THE SAKE OF ADVANCING THE LATTER. THERE MAY BE SHADES OF OPINION IN THE REGIME ON THE RELATIVE PRIORITIES, BUT THIS CASE OFFERS NO EVIDENCE THAT THERE IS A SERIOUS SPLIT. END SUMMARY

2. THE SOLZHENITSYN EXPULSION ILLUSTRATES THAT THE REGIME CAN NO LONGER TREAT INTERNAL SECURITY QUESTIONS IN THE LIMITED CONTEXT OF DOMESTIC POLICY ISOLATED FROM FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES. INTERNAL SECURITY NEVERTHELESS REMAINS AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION. WHILE IN WESTERN EYES THIS CONCERN MAY APPEAR TO BE EXAGGERATED, PARANOIA ABOUT INTERNAL SECURITY SEEMS DEEPLY INBEDDED IN THE MINDS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

3. WEIGHING THE INTERNAL-EXTERNAL ARGUMENTS IN THE SOLZHENITSYN CASE, THE LEADERSHIP APPARENTLY WAS CONVINCED THAT WHAT SOVIET OFFICIALS VIEWED AS A PURSUIT OF MARTYRDOM MEANT THAT THEY SOONER OR LATER WOULD HAVE TO ACT AGAINST HIM. WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE LEADERSHIP MAY HAVE MISJUDGED THE EXTENT OF WESTERN REACTION, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO ABSORB A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CRITICISM. A SOLZHENITSYN ISSUING INCREASINGLY DAMAGING STATEMENTS TO THE WESTERN PRESS, RECEIVING HEAVY WORLD ATTENTION IN PART BECAUSE OF THE MOSCOW DATELINE, APPARENTLY COULD NOT BE COUNTENANCED. MOREOVER, THE REGIME WAS SOMEWHAT CAUGHT UP BY ITS OWN VILIFICATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE WRITER. IN CALLING ATTENTION TO HIM DOMESTICALLY, IT ALSO CALLED ATTENTION TO ITS OWN INACTION, IN EFFECT ADVERTISING TO OTHER DISSIDENTS THAT THEIR ACTIVITY MIGHT GO UNPUNISHED.

4. BUT WHILE SOME WESTERNERS WILL ASSESS SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN THE CASE AS CRUDE AND UNNECESSARY, THE SOLZHENITSYN EXPULSION WAS PROBABLY THE MOST PALATABLE ACTION THE REGIME--FROM ITS OWN POINT OF VIEW--COULD
CONFIDENTIAL

HAVE TAKEN, ONCE IT BECAME CONVINCED THAT THE WRITER'S ACTIVITIES COULD NOT SIMPLY BE IGNORED. A "DISAPPEARANCE," IMPRISONMENT, OR INTERNAL EXILE ALL WOULD HAVE SMACKED OF THE VERY INJUSTICES SOLZHENITSYN DESCRIBED IN HIS BOOK. THE LATTER TWO SOLUTIONS WOULD HAVE CAUSED NEW INTERNATIONAL PROTESTS WHILE PROBABLY NOT SILENCING HIM. A SOLZHENITSYN CRITICIZING THE REGIME FROM ABROAD CAN BE TREATED AS THE REGIME TREATS OTHER CRITICISM FROM ABROAD

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

(AND PERHAPS FROM AN INTERNAL STANDPOINT MORE BELIEVABLY)
AS PART OF THE "REACTIONARY" ATTEMPT TO WRECK DETENTE.

5. A MAJOR QUESTION REMAINS CONCERNING THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REMAINING SMALL GROUP OF SOVIET
DISSIDENTS, WITH SAKHAROV THE MOST PROMINENT PERSON-
ALITY INVOLVED. WE NOTE THAT DISSIDENT WRITER
VLADIMIR MAKSIMOV, WHO HAS SIGNED STATEMENTS IN
SUPPORT OF SAKHAROV AND SOLZHENITSYN, WAS RECENTLY
GIVEN PERMISSION TO VISIT PARIS FOR ONE YEAR, AND
THIS MAY INDICATE FURTHER REGIME WILLINGNESS TO RID
ITSELF OF INTERNAL PROBLEMS BY TRANSFERRING DISSIDENTS
TO FOREIGN SETTINGS WHERE IT IS HOPED THEIR PROMINENCE
WILL EVAPORATE. MANY OTHER DISSIDENTS ARE NOT NEARLY AS
STRONG AS SOLZHENITSYN IN THEIR DESIRE TO REMAIN IN THE
COUNTRY. IN A LUNCHEON CONVERSATION WITH THE CHARGE
FEBRUARY 14, USA INSTITUTE DIRECTOR ARBATOV HINTED THAT
MORE EXPULSIONS MAY FOLLOW IN SAYING THAT EXPULSION IS
A "SERIOUS PUNISHMENT" THAT IS "IN OUR TRADITION,"
REFERRING TO THE "LENIN PERIOD."

5. WHILE MANY LOCAL COURCES HAVE EXPRESSED THE VIEW
THAT THE HARASSMENT OF SOLZHENITSYN INDICATES AN EVEN
MORE WIDESPREAD CRACKDOWN ON NON-CONFORMIST THOUGHT IN
THE COUNTRY, SO LITTLE IS KNOWN OF ACTUAL REGIME INTENTIONS
THAT FEELINGS ARE MIXED. THE SON OF A LATE, FAMOUS SOVIET
AUTHOR, FOR INSTANCE, TOLD AN EMBASSY OFFICER ON THE DAY
OF SOLZHENITSYN'S EXPULSION THAT THE REGIME WOULD NOW BE
EVEN MORE SUSPICIOUS OF TALENTED PEOPLE IN THE CULTURAL
WORLD. AFTER THINKING IT OVER, HOWEVER, HE CHANGED HIS
MIND: "YOU KNOW THIS GOVERNMENT IS VERY STRANGE. NOW
THAT SOLZHENITSYN IS GONE THINGS MAY EVEN BE BETTER
FOR US" (I.E., THE REGIME MAY BE LESS NERVOUS).
CONFIDENTIAL

7. THE SUGGESTION BY SOME WESTERN COMMENTATORS THAT
"HARDLINERS" OPPOSING DETENTE HAVE COME OUT ON
TOP CANNOT BE SUPPORTED. WHILE THERE MAY BE DIFFERENCES
WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP ON THE PRIORITY TO BE PLACED ON
INTERNAL SECURITY WHEN IT CONFLICTS WITH DETENTE, OR
PERHAPS ON HOW MUCH A GIVEN DISSIDENT'S ACTIONS THREATENS
INTERNAL SECURITY, THEY SURELY WERE ALL ANXIOUS TO GET RID OF
SOLZHENITSYN. AND THEIR SOLUTION HAS THE FLAVOR OF
COMPROMISE AND OF CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVES.

8. IN THE CONVERSATION NOTED ABOVE, ARBATOV EXPRESSED
THE VIEW THAT FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS WERE FULLY
WEIGHED IN THE SOVIET DECISION. MOREOVER, HE CALLED
THE ACTION AGAINST SOLZHENITSYN THE "LEAST DAMAGING"

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

OF THE POSSIBILITIES AVAILABLE--PROBABLY ANOTHER REFERENCE
TO THE FOREIGN POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF ACTION AGAINST HIM
AS WELL AS AN ATTEMPT TO PLAY UP THE "HUMANITARIAN"
ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET MOVE.

9. AS FAR AS MODALITIES ARE CONCERNED, FRG EMBASSY HERE
CONTINUES TO SAY IT WAS NOT INVOLVED EXCEPT THAT IT REALIZES,
IN RETROSPECT, THAT THE EIGHT INDIVIDUALS IT VISAED ON
FEBRUARY 8 FOR "INSPECTION OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BONN"
WERE PROBABLY THE EIGHT WHO ACCOMPANIED SOLZHENITSYN ON
THE FLIGHT. THIS PROVIDES SOME INDICATION OF THE TIME
FRAME OF SOVIET PLANNING. INCIDENTALLY, JAPANESE EMBOFF
HERE TOLD US THAT HIS EMBASSY IN BONN HAD HEARD THAT
SOVIETS FIRST APPROACHED THE FRG ON FEBRUARY 5. AFTER
RECEIVING A GO-AHEAD FROM THE FRG, THEY REPORTEDLY INFORMED THE
FRG ON FEBRUARY 8 THAT SOLZHENITSYN WOULD BE COMING OUT
IN "A FEW DAYS."
DUBS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ANTISOVIET, EXPULSION, WRITERS, BOOKS, GULAG ARCHIPLAGO
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 14 FEB 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MOSCOW02221
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740232/aaaabegq.tel
Line Count: 187
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <24 APR 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <11 JUN 2002 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF SOLZHENITSYN EXPULSION
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, UR, (SOLZHENITSYN, ALEKSANDR I)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005